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The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) is an institution besieged. It has endeavored to be
democratic but its attempts to do so have been disastrous. The
typical explanation for this is that the problem is with ICANN: it
fails to meet its democratic obligations. My view is that the problem
is with our understanding of "democracy." Democracy is an empty
concept that fails to describe few, if any, of our genuine political
commitments. In the real world, the failings inherent in
"democracy" have been papered over by some unusual
characteristics of the physical political process. However, in online
trans-national institutions like ICANN, democracy is exposed as a
poor substitute for a number of other conceptions of our political
commitments.,
This Article seeks to articulate these political commitments and
to explain why democracy and ICANN are such a poor mix. It
begins by charting the rise of ICANN and its attempts to be
democratic. It then explains why democracy is an empty shell of a
concept. It then explores some features of democracy and ICANN,
explaining why the online world exposes limitations in implications
* Robert F. Irwin IV Term Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania. E-mail: hunterd@wharton.upenn.edu. I
am indebted to Michael Froomkin and Ed Rubin for invaluable advice,
comments, and ideas. The usual rider applies. To some extent I will be
defending the indefensible (viz ICANN) and so I disclose that I am a panelist
for the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) cases, which is an adjudication
process administered (at some remove) by ICANN. This tenuous connection
aside, I have never had any connection whatsoever to ICANN, its
administration, or its members.
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of democracy such as the nature of the demos, the idea of
constituencies, direct democracy, voting, and the like. It concludes
that ICANN's example demonstrates that democracy is in fact
anything but a coherent general theory of political action. We need
to consider, then, whether we should continue to berate ICANN for
its undemocratic actions.
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Railing away at ICANN because it does not meet some ideal
model of democracy is likely to be about as effective as
complaining that the US. Congress is too dominated by the
money of those who finance political campaigns.
I. INTRODUCTION
Any number of idealized conceptions of democracy have been
projected onto cyberspace. Direct democracy advocates have
suggested that cyberspace reduces political transaction costs to zero,
and thus we can at last have genuine self-government with everyone
voting on every issue all the time. Deliberative democracy theorists
embrace the Internet because it offers the opportunity to engage the
demos, informing each and every one of them, providing them with a
costless way of debating and deliberating. Other examples abound.
Participatory democracy advocates envision a vast sea of committed,
electronically connected citizens directly engaging with their
government-indeed, like the ancient Greek ideal, actually
supplanting government and becoming it. It seems that cyberspace is
like Coke: any democratic theory goes better with it.
Unfortunately, theory and practice are slightly different. Indeed,
the gap between theory and practice is larger in practice than it is in
theory. In this Article I argue that there is a vast gap between
theoretical conceptions of democracy and the reality that operates
within online institutions. The particular institution at issue here is
ICANN. This body is unusual, but, I think, characteristic of the
types of online institutions we will see emerge as cyberspace
matures. It is not tied to any specific physical place or jurisdiction,
and so cannot rely on geographical partitions of the demos. Its
constituents come from multiple arenas with divergent policy
interests, so it cannot rely on homogeneity of interests as a means of
generating political outcomes. Pretty much everything it does is
published online, analyzed in detail, and criticized endlessly. As
such, ICANN is an excellent case study in whether genuine, as
1. Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, Comments on the
Civil Society Statement, at http://www.cpsr.org/internetdemocracy/
Statement July-13_Comments.html (last visited September 1, 2002) (quoting
Michael Roberts, CEO of ICANN).
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opposed to toy, or lab-constructed, online institutions can meet our
expectations of democracy.
ICANN has endeavored to be democratic, in some limited
senses, but its attempts to institute typical democratic mechanisms
have been utterly disastrous. It has representatives drawn from
constituencies which, under traditional democratic theories would be
largely unobjectionable, but in practice have displayed all the worst
features of regulatory capture. It has run an insanely costly election
where all Internet users were entitled to vote, and a vanishingly small
percentage of them actually did. It has suggested that it should look
to elected national governments as a proxy for direct representation
by the people, and has been greeted with howls of derision; not to
mention being accused of everything from bias, through self-service,
to out-and-out conspiracy. ICANN's demos is characterized by a
remarkable combination of vocal opposition and unresponsive
constituency action. In Part I below, I sketch the structural features
of ICANN, and explain the attempts to be democratic, and why they
failed.
There are two possible views why online democracy and
ICANN have been such a disastrous mix. The received wisdom-no
doubt the view held by the majority of participants in this
Symposium-is that the problem is with ICANN: through
ineptitude, foolishness, or rampant power-mongering by its
administrators, it is to blame for failing to meet its democratic
obligations. My view is that the problem is with our understanding
of "democracy." Democracy is an empty concept that fails to
describe few, if any, of our genuine political commitments. In the
real world, the failings inherent in democracy have been papered
over by some unusual characteristics of the physical political
process. However, in genuine cyberspace environments, democracy
is exposed as a poor substitute for a number of other conceptions of
our political commitments.
In Part II below, I examine the contested and contestable
features of democracy. I begin by focusing on the embedded
implications of the word "democracy," and how this gives rise to a
series of arguments against the nature of modem politics and the rise
Spring 2003] 1153
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of the administrative state. Following from Rubin,2 I argue that this
focus distorts the account of the way that modem political
institutions relate to their citizens. Instead, I suggest that we look at
how and whether institutions, most notably the government, actually
meet the political commitments that we consider important. These
political commitments, securing liberty, avoiding oppression,
reducing civil strife, etc., are meaningful in a way that the loaded
term democracy is not.
Part III then examines the nature of democracy and political
commitments in online institutions. Within the context of ICANN, I
examine whether and how these political commitments are met, and
conclude that they may be met, even if we would consider the
process to be anti-democratic. I examine whether our political
commitments can be, and have been, met by online institutions such
as ICANN. Then, I conclude that, if they have not been met to date,
then it has been as a result of deferring to the impoverished idea of
democracy, not because of some systemic problem with online
political institutions.
II. ICANN AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
ICANN is an institution besieged. Having moved beyond its
initial technical mandate into policy setting, it is surrounded on all
sides by outraged political actors and activists who routinely accuse
it of lacking legitimacy, acting improperly, and behaving arbitrarily.
3
The basis for much of the criticism is that ICANN fails to meet the
most fundamental test of political institutions: that it is, in short,
undemocratic. In order to understand this, one has to understand the
nature of ICANN, its structure, and some aspects of its history.
ICANN came into being in 1998 as a result of a number of
events, most notable of which was the U.S. government's policy
document officially titled the Management of Internet Names and
2. See Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
711, 747 (2001).
3. The best place to view these accusations is the ICANNWatch Web site,
which contains an amazing corpus of material on ICANN. See ICANN Watch,
at http://www.icannwatch.org (last visited Sept. 1, 2002). Criticisms of every
single stripe may be found there in the articles and, more particularly, in the
(often anonymous) postings in comment to the articles.
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Addresses, 4 but which is always called the "White Paper." The
White Paper outlined the U.S. government's attitude towards
governance of these issues; rather than continue to be the de jure and
de facto controller of names and addresses on the Internet, the United
States wanted a private entity to take over control.5 Within a
remarkably short time (four months) ICANN was formed, and began
accreting the powers necessary to undertake this job.6
Formed as a non-profit corporation, it has a typical corporate
form: a CEO, a board of directors, various lower-level workers with
responsibility for certain parts of the business, and so forth.7 Given
that its ostensible mandate is to oversee the domain name space and
Internet protocol addresses, there is nothing odd in it being a
corporation. Many standards-setting and technical administration
organizations operate in corporate form. However, unlike a
corporation, ICANN undertakes significant regulatory functions,
which make it look much more like a governmental actor of some
form or another. For example, any changes to the Domain Name
System (DNS) involve some effect upon business interests that have
congealed around domain names. Thus, the addition of new
namespaces, or the creation of a mechanism to resolve disputes
between trademark holders and domain name holders, involve
making decisions that most people would understand as both
regulatory and political.
Therefore, the U.S. government and others almost immediately
saw that ICANN could not operate just as a typical corporate animal,
and that ICANN needed some concession (real or imagined) to
democracy. Thus, ICANN has a large Board of Directors which
initially was to be constituted from various interested constituencies.
These constituencies (domain name registrars, other Internet bodies
concerned with technical matters such as protocols and addresses,
and so on) were represented at the Board level, and also within their
own lower-level advisory groups called "supporting organizations"
4. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg.
31,741 (June 10, 1998).
5. See id.
6. See JONATHAN WEINBERG, GEEKS AND GREEKS 1 (2001), available at
http://www.law.wayne.edu/weinberg/geeksandgreeks.pdf.
7. See ICANN, BYLAWS FOR INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED
NAMES AND NUMBERS (2002) [hereinafter ICANN, BYLAWS], available at
http://www.icann.org/general/bylaws.htm.
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or "advisory committees." 8 There was also specific consideration
given to the interests of sovereign countries, which was recognized
as important given that ICANN has responsibility for country code
top-level domains (ccTLDs) like .au for Australia, .se for Sweden,
and .cc for the Cocos Islands.
9
What was not initially anticipated was the idea that any part of
ICANN should be accountable to the Internet community as a whole.
That is, the idea of popularly elected representatives within ICANN
was initially ignored, and then resisted. However, the pressures in
favor of popularly elected representatives were too great, and
eventually ICANN blinked. Nine' ° of the nineteen directors were to
be elected from the Internet community "at large."" These positions
have been a source of consternation ever since, both for those within
ICANN who oppose populist elections and the specific results of the
elections, and those outside ICANN who argue that the power of the
people has been watered down to the point of being purely symbolic.
Two of the directors were elected on a platform that promised
constant criticism and oversight of the Board, 12 and have made good
on the promise ever since. ICANN now presents the unedifying
spectacle of a house divided against itself, with increasingly
rancorous exchanges between the directors played out on a global
8. There are currently three supporting organizations: the Address
Supporting Organization, the Protocol Supporting Organization, and the
Domain Name Supporting Organization; as well as a number of advisory
committees, including 'the Technical Advisory Committee, Government
Advisory Committee, and so on. See WEINBERG, supra note 6, at 6 (2001).
9. The sovereign countries' interests are provided for within an advisory
body called the Government Advisory Committee.
10. Although these nine positions began, effectively, as internal
appointments, ICANN was forced to introduce elections for five of the
positions. See infra text accompanying notes 111-15.
11. See Preliminary Report, Meeting of the ICANN Board in Yokohama
(July 16, 2000) [hereinafter Preliminary Report], available at
www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-16julOO.htm (describing the various
positions of the ICANN Board and the implications of the election).
12. See Karl Auerbach Platform, available at http://www.cavebear.com/
icann-board/platform.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2002). Andy Mueller-Maguhn,
the European director, was seen as holding the same views as Auerbach, but
proved to be quite a quiet director. See Gary Chapman, Stirring the "Dot-
Whatever" Pot, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2000, available at http://www.edu-
cyberpg.com/Intemet/DOMAIN%20NAME/garychapman.html.
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stage. Recently one of the directors took ICANN to court in order to
force disclosure of documents. 13
These internal structural features aside, other aspects of ICANN
attract fire. Most notable has been the creation of the UDRP, a
private adjudication mechanism that seeks to resolve some types of
disputes between real-world trademark owners and online domain
name registrants. The introduction of the UDRP was controversial in
part because it was seen as bypassing national court systems. More
importantly, the UDRP privileged trademark owners over domain
name owners under most conditions. Since then, the UDRP has
become more controversial as it is seen as being biased against
domain name holders, who win only a tiny percentage of the actions
brought against them.
ICANN has since wallowed in the mire of its own creation, with
its decisions attracting ongoing criticism, and its decision-making
processes bogging down in the mud of accountability and
transparency concerns. In order to forestall inevitable U.S.
governmental intervention, 14 ICANN recently announced a structural
reform process. 15 The reform proposals include removal of the
at-large directors, changes in oversight processes, and suggestions to
use national governments as proxies for popular representation.
16
Since many of the reforms seek to facilitate decision-making, and
consequently involve a reduction in direct accountability to an
electorate and the removal of some oversight controls, the
suggestions have stoked the already-glowing fires of criticism.
ICANN's apostate director, Karl Auerbach, who perhaps best
represents the critical view of the reform process, said: "This
13. See ICANN, ADVISORY, COURT RULING IN AUERBACH V. ICANN
LAWSUIT, (2002), at http://www.icann.org/announcements/advisory-
29ju102.htm.
14. ICANN still operates pursuant to an agreement with the U.S.
Department of Commerce. This agreement is up for re-negotiation this year.
15. See M. STUART LYNN, PRESIDENT'S REPORT: ICANN-THE CASE FOR
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morning ICANN killed the concept of public participation in ICANN
and established in its stead a paternalistic oligarchy."'
17
For all the criticism, ICANN is not a remarkably secretive or
tyrannical organization. It shares many of the features of
democratically constituted institutions existing in the real world. Its
decisions are announced after notice is given of proposals, and time
for comment is allowed (though this period is regrettably short). 18 It
runs discussion lists for interested parties to have a say in both the
process and outcome of its decision-making. It has formal
representation for the community at large. Its decision-making is, at
least in principle, based on the notion of consensus, an entirely
unobjectionable (if unworkable) democratic principle. The dispute
resolution mechanism which it created abides by all of the formal
requirements for both the rule of law and natural justice-stated
laws, neutral arbiters, opportunity for pleading one's case, and so on.
It may be argued that the outcomes of this process are structurally
biased against one set of interests, and indeed there is equivocal
evidence of this, 19 but this is the same criticism that is regularly
17. E-mail from Karl Auerbach, karl@cavebear.com (Mar. 14, 2002), to
politech@politechbot.com, at http://www.politechbot.com/p-03267.html (on
file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
18. See ICANN, BYLAWS, supra note 7, art. III, § 3.
19. See, e.g., MICHAEL GEIST, FAIR.COM?: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
ALLEGATIONS OF SYSTEMIC UNFAIRNESS IN THE ICANN UDRP, available at
http://aixl.utottawa.ca/geist/geistudrp.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2003);
MICHAEL GEIST, FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR.COM?: AN UPDATE ON BIAS
ALLEGATIONS AND THE ICANN UDRP, available at
http://aixl.uottawa.ca/geist/fairupdate.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2003); MILTON
MUELLER, ROUGH JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF ICANN's DISPUTE RESOLUTION
POLICY, available at http://www.acm.org/usacm/IG/roughjustice.pdf (last
visited Jan. 10, 2003). Cf INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION, THE
UDRP BY ALL ACCOUNTS WORKS EFFECTIVELY REBUTTAL TO ANALYSIS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF PROFESSOR MICHAEL GEIST IN "FAIR.COM?" AND
"FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR.COM?" (May 6, 2002), available at
http://www.inta.org/downloads/tapudrp_2paper2002.pdf (rebuttal to Geist's
argument that ICANN favors complainant trademark owners);
INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION, UDRP-A SUCCESS STORY: A
REBUTTAL TO THE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF PROFESSOR MILTON
MUELLER IN "ROUGH JUSTICE" (May 6, 2002), available at
www.inta.org/downloads/tapudrp_lpaper2002.pdf (concluding that Mueller's
article is based on faulty premises and a misinterpretations of data); ANNETTE
KUR, UDRP: A STUDY BY THE MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN AND
INTERNATIONAL PATENT, COPYRIGHT AND COMPETITION LAW, available at
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made of national laws and courts which conform to our expectations
of democracy.
In short, ICANN is a reasonably open and responsive
organization. It is more transparent and accountable than, say, the
vast majority of non-profit organizations, publicly traded
corporations, universities (whether public or private), or indeed
almost any other type of private organization that one can imagine.
Why then is it accused of being such an intolerable organization?
Many people, indeed ICANN itself, see the body as a governmental
actor, and moreover they see it as a governmental actor which has a
commitment to direct democracy. The problems with ICANN then
have something to do with its strange quasi-corporate, quasi-
government nature and the high-handed character of its actions, but
perhaps more interestingly have a great deal to do with our lack of
understanding of what it means to be an online democratic
institution.
In Part III, I explain the reasons why non-idealized online
institutions like ICANN cannot be democratic in the way usually
assumed by critics. The reason for this has nothing to do with
ICANN's failings but is based on our understanding of the concept
of democracy. Therefore, Part III is given over to explaining the
general problem with democracy, and the specific problem of online
democracy.
III. GETTING PAST DEMOCRACY
ICANN is routinely accused of lacking legitimacy and behaving
without a mandate from its constituents, among other criticisms.
Modem Western conceptions of political legitimacy are, of course,
grounded in expectations that derive from our understanding of
democracy. Hence, direct democracy advocates favor direct
mandates from the demos on issues of varying generality, generated
through plebiscites or referenda. Madisonian representative
democracy relies on elected representatives who are responsible to
their constituents. 20  And the modem theories of deliberative
democracy focus on the legitimacy gained by inclusive, rational
http://www.intellecprop.mpg.de/Online-Publikationen/2002/UDRP-study-
final-02.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2003) (evaluating how the UDRP functions).
20. See JAMES S. FISHIXN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION 16-17, 44
(1991).
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debate on political issues.2' Whatever your favorite flavor of
democracy, our conception of the modem Western state relies in
large part on the assumption of democracy for its legitimacy. As a
result, criticisms of ICANN's legitimacy stem essentially from
assumptions about the nature of democracy within our political
system.
This seems to be a reasonable approach, and one might first
consider that it is a bad thing that ICANN is "undemocratic."
However, an examination of the nature of the modem Western state
reveals that it too suffers from a series of "democratic deficits" that
call into question either the nature of the state or the nature of our
understanding of the concept of democracy. In keeping with a
number of others, most notably Ed Rubin, I suggest that the problem
is not with the political components of the modem state, but rather
with the concept of democracy.
A. Aristotle's Dead Hand
Aristotle's original conception of a democracy was of a direct
democracy, with the by-now familiar requirement that all citizens
vote on all substantive issues and all citizens would be obliged to
serve within the Athenian Senate.22 The notion of rule by assembly
was common to many city states, and it was particularly pronounced
within Athens. 23  With the translation of his Politics, Aristotle's
views on the nature of democracy became a model for democratic
thinking from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century. 24 However, as
Rubin notes, the problem with direct democracy, and certainly the
version preferred by the Athenians, is that we have never seen it in
any Western political system since the Classical period. 25 Though
some other medieval political systems like the Italian city-states or
the Swiss cantons bore a superficial similarity to this type of
organization, they turned out to be a dead end of Western political
development.
26
21. See Rubin, supra note 2, at 747-55.
22. See id. at 715-17, 716-17 n.15.
23. See RAPHAEL SEALEY, THE ATHENIAN REPUBLIC 92-96 (1987)
(describing the nature of ancient Greek assemblies).
24. See Rubin, supra note 2, at 715-17.
25. See id. at717.
26. See id.
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Democratic thinking abandoned its assumption of direct voting
and revolving assemblies and turned instead to the concept of
representation. The development of representative democracy as the
dominant form of Western political systems was not due to the
imposition of a theory of democracy, but reflected the rise of
collective organizations such as guilds, the Church, and universities,
among others. The two characteristic features of representative
democracy-the view that "what affects all in like fashion should be
approved by all' 27 and the idea that another could act in one's
stead2 8 -owe nothing to initial conceptions of democracy and
everything to the emergence of medieval corporate entities.
29
More recent has been the emergence of "deliberative
democracy" as the preeminent theory of democracy.30 This theory's
central claim is that democracy is defined by the existence of a "free,
inclusive, rational debate by citizens that determines the basic thrust
of public policy."31 On this view, democracy, therefore, requires an
27. "[Q]uod omnes similiter tangit, ab omnibus comprobetur. ... " Gaines
Post, A Roman Legal Theory of Consent, Quod Omnes Tangit, in Medieval
Representation, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 66, 68.
28. See GAINES POST, STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LEGAL THOUGHT 91-238
(1964) (discussing the rise of representation, medieval assemblies, and
parliaments).
29. See Rubin, supra note 2, at 718-19; see also ARTHUR P. MONAHAN,
CONSENT, COERCION AND LIMIT: THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF
PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 97-133 (1987) (discussing the development of
legal concepts in the thirteenth century, particularly in England, France, and
northern Italy).
30. Although "deliberative democracy" seems to be the nom-du-jour,
similar theories have gone by other names. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER,
STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE (1984)
("strong democracy"); JOHN S. DRYZEK, DISCURSIVE DEMOCRACY: POLITICS,
POLICY, AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (1990) ("discursive democracy"); JANE
MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1980) ("unitary
democracy").
31. Rubin, supra note 2, at 747; see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980) (explaining various principles of liberal
democracy and social justice); JOSEPH M. BESSETrE, THE MILD VOICE OF
REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT 1-5 (Benjamin I. Page ed., 1994) (explaining the American
history of deliberative democracy); JOHN S. DRYZEK, DISCURSIVE
DEMOCRACY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (1990) (exploring a
classical Aristotelian model of politics, participatory democracy,
communicative action, practical reason, and critical theory); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980)
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open exchange of views and informed debate in order for political
and social consensus to emerge. 32  As we shall see shortly, this
theory works tolerably well as an idealized normative account of
how a costless political system might work, but is hopelessly
incapable of describing any meaningful features of our actual
political system.
The purpose of this overview is not to provide simply an
historical account of the development of democratic thinking and
theorizing. Instead, its purpose is to articulate the assumptions that
are built into our understanding of the term democracy. Rubin
suggests that these assumptions are "sedimented" into all theories
which characterize themselves as concerning democracy, and indeed
these assumptions live within the very term "democracy":
We may think that we have appropriated the term for our
own uses, exercising control over its meaning, but the term
is more likely to exercise control over us, challenging us
with questions from our vaguely recollected past such as:
"Shouldn't all your decisions be made by an assembly of
(discussing the dichotomy of constitutional legislative interpretation); JAMES S.
FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
DEMOCRATIC REFORM (1991) (exploring how to reconcile democracy and
deliberation by bringing power to the people under conditions where the
people can think about the power they exercise); JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE
VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY (1995) (exploring
whether people can take an active role in creating their voice and determining
what information they will need to deliberate and then speak); AMY GUTMANN
& DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996) (illustrating
the kind of moral disagreement that fuels the evolution of deliberative
democracy); JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY
(William Rehg trans., 1996) (emphasizing the role of public discourse in
democracy); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) (exploring how
deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive doctrines may exist together
and affirm the political conception of a constitutional regime); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993)
(proposing a reassessment of the appropriate role of the First Amendment and
free expression in the democratic process); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION (1993) (examining the First Amendment and concluding that
deregulated economic markets are neither sufficient nor necessary for a system
of free expression); Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,
in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 67 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds.,
1997) (discussing deliberative democracy as a fundamental political ideal).
32. See Rubin, supra note 2, at 747-49.
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the entire populace? Shouldn't public officials be selected
by lot, so that each of you may rule and then be ruled in
turn
3 3
Rubin's argument is that the pre-modem conceptions of
democracy infect any theory or argument which uses democracy as a
normative standard against which an institution is judged. The worst
thing that one can say of a government or its institutions is that it is
"undemocratic." But the term carries with it a series of implications
from the pre-modem, simpler era, and so modem political
institutions cannot help but be found wanting. Rubin's focus is on
criticisms made of the rise of the vast, credentialed, undemocratic
administrative arm of Western political systems (specifically the
executive in the U.S. system). He suggests that the focus on the
concept of democracy makes us "overlook or underestimate features
that are central to that government's operation and to imagine or
overemphasize other features that are of minimal importance."3 4
The obvious example is the extended attack on judicial review
by the Legal Process School.35 This School characterized judicial
review, specifically the role of the Supreme Court during its
opposition to the New Deal legislation, as anti-democratic.36
Subsequently, the same charges have been leveled at the emergence
of a vast executive within U.S. government that has been lambasted
as the fourth branch of government. This fourth branch was never
mentioned in the Constitution and is therefore presumptively invalid
as a consequence. The rise of the administrative state, with its
reliance on a non-elected bureaucracy, has been cause for much
gnashing of teeth and casting of allegations of a democratic deficit at
33. Id. at 725.
34. Id.
35. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16, 19 (Yale Univ. Press, 2d ed.
1986) (1962) (suggesting that the electoral process is the supreme embodiment
of democracy, and that judicial review undermines this process); JESSE H.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 10
(1980) (characterizing judicial review as contrary to majority rule, which is
described as the fundamental principle of democracy); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw 4-5 (1980)
(arguing that the unelected and politically non-responsible judiciary should not
be free to stop the elected representatives from governing as they like).
36. See Rubin, supra note 2, at 711-12.
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the heart of the modem U.S. political system.37 The same criticism
is reflected perhaps more strongly with discussions and criticisms of
online democracy, and specifically within the analysis made of
ICANN. ICANN is routinely accused of failing to be democratic.
38
In Part IV, I suggest that these accusations are unhelpful, for as
Rubin suggests, to label something "undemocratic" is not a valid
criticism of institutions within modem Western political systems.
39
Rubin's account is tremendously helpful at explaining that there
is a problem with our understanding of democracy, which in turn
leads to unhelpful criticisms of modem political institutions.
However, if democracy is not a good description of them, then the
issue arises as to what political commitments we hold. Rubin's
method is to follow on from Habermas and use micro-analysis, the
positive analysis of the political institution at the level of the
interaction between citizen and organization.40 The idea is, simply,
that individuals create social systems.41 In describing the social
system we should, therefore, focus first on the aggregate of
individual interactions in order to understand the higher level process
that emerges.42 For example, consider elections. According to many
democratic theories, voting holds the preeminent role in the political
system. However, in micro-analysis, voting is merely a political
signal that is controlled by the government: in terms of timing,
choice, capacity of persons, information granted about the parties,
and so forth.43 Thus, elections are not an autonomous signal from
the individual, but rather a government-generated signal that
generates a response from a government-generated populace. 44
Therefore, the invocation of a "fair and free" election is largely
rhetoric and does not of itself reflect a political commitment. Why
then have elections? Rubin suggests that we have elections to deal
with our commitments to ensure a stable succession in government
37. See id. at 711-13.
38. Indeed, one of the more trenchant critics, Jonathan Weinberg, explicitly
adopts an Aristotilean concept of democracy with which to lambast ICANN.
See WEINBERG, supra note 6, at 11.
39. See Rubin, supra note 2, at 714-15.
40. See id. at 752-55.
41. Seeid. at 755.
42. See id. at 755-56.
43. See id. at 756-57.
44. See id.
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(one without bloodshed or intractable rivalry), a periodic opportunity
to review competence of government members, and to ensure some
(though not absolute) responsiveness of the representatives.
45
Focusing at this level, therefore, provides a better definition of the
commitments we hold than the notion of democracy.
For the purposes of this Article, there are a number of
difficulties with applying this approach. Not only is micro-analysis a
positive methodology without external normative grounding, it also
has only really been applied to real-world political activities.
Moreover, it can be seen as generating a series of conclusions (such
as elections are to handle succession) which are as susceptible to
criticism as the concept of democracy. Finally, democracy has a
wonderful concreteness and solidity as a concept that appears to be
invariant across times and cultures. Micro-analysis, being
descriptive, is necessarily a partial account dependent on the
individuals being examined at any one point.
I am going to leave these concerns aside for the purposes of this
Article. I do not defend this decision, except to say that this Article
seeks to remove democracy as the basis of analysis of electronically
constituted organizations. In the end we may come back to
democracy as the only appropriate way of understanding and
critiquing online institutions, but for my purposes it is enough to
show how an exclusive focus on democracy is damaging.
Before providing evidence of this within ICANN, let me provide
a high-profile online example as a warning of the dangers that
unthinking acceptance of democracy poses to an analysis of what
actually occurs within the Internet public sphere. In the Section that
follows, I show how adherence to the ideals of deliberative
democracy can translate to untenable conclusions when examining
the online environment. After this, I turn in Part IV to how we see
other problems which emerge when we apply a naYve view of
democracy to ICANN.
B. Philippic.com
Recently, Cass Sunstein, the eminent University of Chicago Law
School professor, constitutional commentator, and democracy
theorist, published a broad philippic against the anti-democratic
45. See id. at 758-59.
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features of the Internet, entitled Republic. com.46 It begins with a
short sketch of the near future, where Sunstein suggests that we will
soon have perfect filtering, so that we will see, read, or hear only that
we which we want to see, read, or hear; and will never be confronted
with anything that we do not want.47 We will go through our lives
cosseted in a warm technological blanket that will reinforce those
voices which agree with us, and will preclude any different voices in
our lives.
This prospect troubles Sunstein deeply. He sees the effects of
perfect filtering as pernicious, and inimical to democratic ideals.
48
For a start, it removes the public forum where we are confronted by
others speaking freely. 49 Sunstein, in keeping with other deliberative
democracy scholars, argues that our democratic society relies on a
citizenry exposed to many viewpoints and a polity which is
characterized by reflection and debate. 50 Online perfect filtering,
argues Sunstein, destroys this hitherto-assumed feature of our
democratic system.51 There "can be no assurance of freedom in a
system committed to the 'Daily Me.'
52
To support this argument, Sunstein applies the findings from
studies in social psychology. 53 Though Republic.com recognizes that
online fora may provide important outlets for self-expression,
Sunstein outlines a terrifying danger. Special interest sites, he
argues, will fracture the community into small pockets of special
46. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001).
47. See id. at 3-5.
48. See id. at 7-10, 17-22.
49. See id. at 27-37.
50. See id. at 38. Deliberative democracy is a component of Pettit's
conception of republicanism and can be seen in part as a response to an
alternate democratic theory-that of direct democracy. See PHILIP PETTIT,
REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNANCE 129-34 (1997).
A number of theories of Internet governance stress the benefits of some
features of Internet direct democracy. See, e.g., Dick Morris, Direct
Democracy and the Internet, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1033 (2001). Others, most
notably Neil Weinstock Netanel, suggest that Internet direct democracy has
significant theoretical problems. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace
Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 395 (2000) (arguing against cyberspace self-governance from the
position of democratic theory).
51. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 49-50.
52. Id. at 50.
53. See id. at 56-80.
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interest that divide along race, gender, political, or other lines. 54 In
Sunstein's view, this will lead to terrifying group polarization.
55
This is the name given to one type of effect on people's viewpoints
that occurs when they deliberate. 56 In numerous studies it has been
shown that after deliberation people generally move towards more
extreme viewpoints in the direction to which the group's members
were initially inclined.57 Thus, in group deliberation settings, French
students become more critical of the United States, moderately pro-
feminist women become more critical of men, and whites
predisposed to racial prejudice express more racist sentiments, and so
forth. Sunstein argues that this group polarization effect has
tremendous importance to our conception of the benefits and
detriments of the Internet as a communications medium.58  As
interests are segmented into, and addressed by, individual Web sites,
a segmented communications environment will emerge. As perfect
filtering becomes a reality, people will only hear from a small group
of like-minded people. Since they will increasingly talk only to each
other, group polarization will occur, leading to more extreme
viewpoints than that which any of the members of that group initially
held. Extremism will feed on extremism in this balkanized
environment, driving people further apart, fracturing our society, and
causing hatred, violence, and a loss of community identity.59
Republic.com is a very good example of democracy theorists'
approach to online political theory. The deliberative democracy
ideal here is combined with some social psychology, and the result is
a terrifying, dystopian vision of the Internet's effect on our society.
The problem, however, is that this vision is completely wrong. As I
have argued at quite ridiculous length elsewhere,6° Sunstein's view is
unsupported either by the technology, the social science, or empirical
54. See Dan Hunter, Philippic.com, 90 CAL. L. REV. 611, 619-20 (2002).
55. See id. at 620.
56. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 65.
57. See id. at 67-68.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 80-84. In a related aspect of his argument, Sunstein discusses
"disinformation cascades" which play a similar, or perhaps reinforcing role, to
group polarization. Id. For the sake of brevity in this account, I focus here
only on group polarization which is central to Sunstein's concern.
60. See Hunter, supra note 54. I should note that while the length of the
article is ridiculous, the content is, of course, wonderful.
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analysis of the nature of our political system. Perfect filtering is
essentially science fiction; it is a vision of the future owing more to
the hype of MIT's Media Lab and NASDAQ companies than any
realistic assessment of how filtering can work. In any event, even if
perfect filtering were possible, it would be little different from media
filtering which we currently enjoy and which has not lead to a
terrifying rise in extremism. Moreover, the social psychology
research on which Sunstein relies does not support his extreme
conclusion. He fails to give due regard to the fact that, at times,
groups actually de-polarize and move to less extreme positions, or
they move to extreme positions that are actually moderate. He also
notably fails to establish that the conditions for group polarization
are actually present in the Internet entities, which he identifies as so
troubling to democracy.
Finally, Sunstein's adherence to deliberative democracy causes
him to make assumptions about how democracy should operate
online.61 Sunstein has indicated that his intention was to get hold of
"some neglected requirements of democratic self-government." 62 It
is not hard to see the importance of deliberative democracy to
Republic. com's specific thesis that we need more and better forms of
Internet communication in order that our democracy be rendered
meaningful. The fear of group polarization and fragmentation of the
communications infrastructure poses a huge concern to anyone
committed to deliberation as the core of democratic engagement.
Rubin's account of the pre-modem implications built into the
concept of democracy are extremely helpful in an assessment of the
validity of this aspect of Sunstein's argument. This cashes out in two
specific ways. First is the deliberative democracy theorist's views
about the nature of deliberation in a modem society. Deliberation
assumes an intensive interchange of ideas in a context where the
speakers are in direct contact and can accept or reject the other's
63arguments. With a small number of people involved, such as in the
ancient Athenian assembly,64 the concept of deliberation within the
61. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 65-68.
62. Id. at 192.
63. See Rubin, supra note 2, at 749.
64. See id. "The metaphor of deliberation among the members of civil
society in general seems inspired by an ancient Greek assembly, where all the
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political process is an accurate description. In the modem state with
hundreds of institutional agencies and where citizens are engaged
with these agencies rather than each other, the notion of deliberation
is empirically implausible. 65 Under these conditions, "deliberation"
is not an accurate description; it is a trope. And it is a trope that
masks the reality of the political process; "the cost of indulging in
this enticing metaphor... is that one underemphasizes or ignores the
more subtle gradations of contemporary politics." 66  Sunstein's
worry over the effects of group polarization is a worry that
deliberation cannot operate as idealized in the deliberative
democratic account. His delight at the results of the (idealized and
artificial) deliberative polls of Fishkin67 is a delight at centerpiece of
deliberative democracy being demonstrated. However, both the
worry and delight evaporate if, as Rubin suggests, these features of
deliberation are simply not found in the modem Western state,
whose political commitments we are happy with.68 If deliberation is
not central to our political process, then there is little to fear even if
we accept Sunstein's charge that the Internet reduces deliberation.
The second problem for Sunstein's fears for the Internet is
deliberative democracy's assumption that the deliberation must be
rational.69  This particular assumption is at the core of
Republic.com's concern with group polarization effects on people's
citizens meet to debate and decide 'all causes, or at any rate... the most
important."' Id.
65.
In a modem state, particularly an administrative state with its
hundreds of operational agencies, citizens and citizen groups are more
likely to be engaged in intensive interactions with a particular agency
than they are with each other. Bankers, factory managers, and large-
scale farmers do not interact with members of the other groups very
much, but they may talk to their own regulatory agencies more often




67. See JAMES S. FIsHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE (1995); James S.
Fishkin & Robert C. Luskin, Bring Deliberation to the Democratic Dialogue,
in THE POLL WITH A HUMAN FACE 3, 23 (Maxwell McCombs & Amy
Reynolds eds., 1999).
68. See Rubin, supra note 2, at 748-49.
69. See id. at 749-50.
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thoughts, 70 which lead to irrational deliberation. As Rubin
demonstrates, contemporary political and social debate are anything
but rational.71 Modem political life is characterized by widespread
irrationality.72 Within our political process, appeals to emotion or
personal interest are the norm. Measured, reflective discussion and
analysis of the merits and demerits of the argument-such as one
finds within Fishkin's deliberative polls-are atypical.73 Unlike
Sunstein,74 Rubin does not decry this as a failing of our polity.
Instead, he suggests that it is a feature of our modem political
system.75 Peoples' lives are affected by politics: their salary is
reduced or increased by political choices, their liberty is threatened,
their children's opportunity is reduced or improved, and so on. We
should not be surprised that the modem arena of political debate is
shot through with emotionalism. Calls for rational deliberation
within our democracy may make the commentator feel better, but
they are likely to lead nowhere, and perhaps more important, do not
reflect our genuinely held political commitments. 76 If this is so, then
we should not be troubled even if we accept Sunstein's argument that
the Internet creates group polarization on the basis of appeals to
peoples' emotional, rather than rational, side. The modem state will
not fall apart if emotions are tweaked. In fact, the modem state relies
on these emotions being tweaked.
Rubin's account is valuable here for a number of reasons. First,
it allows us to recognize that tagging something as "undemocratic"
means little when the word "democratic" is not a good descriptor of
the modem political system with which we are currently quite happy.
Even if we accept Sunstein's implicit claim that the Internet is a
70. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 5-9.
71. See Rubin, supra note 2, at 750.
72. See id. "Contemporary political debate obviously fails to achieve this
standard, something one can readily confirm by spending a few minutes
listening to political talk radio." Id.
73. See Fishkin & Luskin, supra note 67, at 3-7.
74. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 84-87. Republic.com is an attempt to
explain how certain irrational communication features of the Internet pose
problems for democracy.
75. See Rubin, supra note 2, at 751.
76. See id. at 751-53. Rubin explains that this is not a concern, since the
political process does manage to serve our needs perfectly well. See id. It is
just that focusing on the requirement of rational deliberation is to focus on the
wrong thing.
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danger to our democracy, little follows from it. Second, the specific
challenges to deliberative democracy have serious purchase in any
analysis of Republic.com. These challenges demonstrate that the
fears of group polarization, even if real, do not threaten our central
political commitments.
I suggest, therefore, that the invocation of the concept of
democracy can have corrosive effects on our ability to understand
(and criticize) the online environment. Within the criticisms of
ICANN this problem is particularly pronounced.
IV. ICANN AND ELECTRONIC DEMOCRACY
In this Part, I explain how the pre-modem implications inherent
in democracy theories are applied to new entities like ICANN. Here,
I endeavor to demonstrate how reliance on democracy to criticize
online institutions is a counter-productive way of criticizing these
institutions. If we are concerned about changing these organizations
to reflect our genuine political commitments, then we need a better
understanding of these commitments. ICANN deserves
condemnation if it fails to meet genuinely held political
commitments. It does not deserve to be criticized for being
undemocratic when that term embodies political commitments that
are unrealistic, not held by relevant constituencies, or irrelevant.
A. Of Hippogriffs, Shareholders, and Citizens
ICANN is a curious institution. One is tempted to characterize it
as neither fish nor fowl. But perhaps it is better to suggest that, like
medieval monsters such as the griffin or the more outlandish
hippogriff, it is a curious grafting of multiple animal parts: head and
claws of an eagle, body of a lion, back legs of a horse. The grafting
in ICANN's case is between a corporate entity operating within the
purview of a sovereign government and a trans-national
governmental entity that can be considered autonomous. ICANN is
a private, non-profit California corporation and subject to the usual
strictures of corporate entities.77 However, one of its fundamental
functions is that of trans-national regulator, and in this sense, it
appears much more like an executive agency.
77. See Edward Brunet, Defending Commerce's Contract Delegation of
Power to 1CANN, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1, 8-9 (2002).
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The reason for building a quasi-governmental corporate
hippogriff is, by now, well-known. By the mid-nineties the United
States realized it was faced with an international diplomatic problem
and a regulatory nightmare.78 It effectively owned the Internet, by
virtue of the Department of Commerce's control over IP address and
domain name allocation. 79 This included effective control over the
allocation of registry functions within ccTLDs such as .fr (France),
.it (Italy), .za (South Africa), and so forth. Though Internet take-up
in other countries was, at the time, sketchy, it was not hard to foresee
a period when diplomatic issues would emerge over U.S. control of
the namespaces of other sovereign countries.8 0 There was also the
pesky problem that the "netizens" of the day were broadly libertarian
and committed to running the Internet as it had been run to date.
Since the status quo involved self-governance based on "rough
consensus and running code"8 '-the early governance of the Internet
being primarily about technical issues--overt imposition of
regulatory power was not going to go over well. For these reasons
and others, the United States wanted an entity interposed between
itself and the day-to-day decision-making over addresses and
namespaces. Its hand was forced by the actions of Jon Postel, the
creator and "real" owner of the DNS, who conjured ICANN out of
whole cloth and anointed it as ruler.8 2 Though the process may have
occurred in a way not envisaged by them, the creation of ICANN
was in keeping with the aims of the U.S. government, and U.S.
regulators were no doubt relieved that it did not have to intervene
directly.
78. See Angela Proffitt, Drop the Government, Keep the Law: New
International Body for Domain Name Assignment Can Learn from United
States Trademark Experience, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 601, 604-06 (1999)
(explaining the past management of the DNS).
79. See id. at 607.
80. See id. at 607-08 (1999) (noting the worry of the European Union,
Australia, and others that the U.S. had excessive control over the DNS).
81. JOSEPH REAGLE, WHY THE INTERNET is GOOD: COMMUNITY
GOVERNANCE THAT WORKS WELL 11 (1998), at http://
cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/reagle/regulation-I 9990326.html (quoting
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) member David Clark's comment in a
1992 IETF meeting: "We reject kings, presidents, and voting. We believe in
rough consensus and running code.").
82. See Proffitt, supra note 78, at 609.
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ICANN's combination of corporate and governmental features
is interesting for a number of reasons. Like the hippogriff and
unlike, say, a mule, ICANN does not combine the characteristics of
its parents uniformly. Whole body parts of one animal are grafted
onto parts of other animals. Some parts of ICANN operate like a
corporation, while others are much more like governmental
instrumentalities. For example, in dealing with disclosure of some
sorts of information it resolutely maintains that it is a corporation and
sees no need to engage in the kind of disclosure requirements
assumed by agencies.8 3 In relation to determining the appropriate
relationship between intellectual property interests that arise online
and offline, it operates like a government agency. Not only did it
convene hearings on the appropriate balance to strike, it received a
report from a prominent international body, the World Intellectual
Property Organization, promulgated a law as a consequence of the
report, and created an entire adjudication system to deal with
disputes pursuant to this new law. 84
This is unusual, perhaps unprecedented, in an agency/corporate
organization. However, more extraordinary than this is that the
hippogriff thinks it is a horse. ICANN often suggests that it is a
private corporation that only needs to comply with the usual
obligations of such a body.8 5 Yet at other times it seems to recognize
that it holds a particular regulatory function, and as a result, it needs
to find an appropriate ground of legitimacy.86  Appeals for
legitimacy are, of course, foreign to corporations. They are
constituted to make profits, or to do good, or whatever. But one
hardly ever sees a concern in corporate governance to find a warrant
for what they do, outside that which is imposed by the market. So
ICANN, as well as other governmental organizations, does recognize
83. See ICANN, BYLAWS, supra note 7, art. II, § 1.
84. See KUR, supra note 19, at 4.
85. See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing Tamar Frankel's report on ICANN as
a corporation).
86. It is suggested that ICANN's attempt to look like a U.S. federal
regulatory agency is a search for legitimacy. See Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN
and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187 (2000); TAMAR FRANKEL,
ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT OF THE INTERNET CORPORATION FOR
ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (ICANN), REPORT TO THE MARKLE
FOUNDATION 1 (July 12, 2002), at http://www.markle.org/news/
ICANNfinI_9.pdf; discussion infra Part IV.A. 1.
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that it needs a warrant for the actions it takes from time to time.
When it does so, however, it justifies its actions based on the idea of
"consensus" as the touchstone of legitimacy. ICANN is often
criticized for not actually meeting its commitment to consensus. But
even leaving this aside, there is a serious question to be answered as
to how any significant political institution could ever meet the claim
that it governs by consensus. Moreover, as explored below, the idea
of consensus is really a modified form of direct democracy, a theory
which we have earlier seen is an incoherent description of modern
political institutions.
The dual character of ICANN leads to alternative views of the
kinds of political commitments we should expect. One view, most
recently expressed by Tamar Frankel, is that ICANN needs to
conform with corporate governance expectations.87  The other
approach, most obviously identified with Michael Froomkin8 8 and
Jonathan Weinberg, 89 is to demand that ICANN comply with the
usual democratic expectations we have for governmental institutions.
Models stemming from corporate governance and democratic theory
are not irreconcilable, 90 but they do tend to focus on different
features of an institution. Corporate governance models are
concerned with responsible management and disclosure of
meaningfully relevant material to stakeholders.9 1  Political
democracy models look to the features discussed above: voice,
citizenship, representation, control over representative by
constituents, etc. In essence, these models advance differing political
commitments, and an examination of the requirements of these
models casts useful light on the question of ICANN's democratic
legitimacy.
87. See FRANKEL, supra note 86.
88. See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to
Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000).
89. See Jonathan Weinberg, ICAN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50
DUKE L.J. 187 (2000).
90. For example, expectations within democracy are increasingly being
placed upon corporate entities, particularly in relation to workers rights to have
a say in the administration of the corporation. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A
PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1985).
91. See FRANKEL, supra note 86.
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1. ICANN as executive agency
As discussed previously, ICANN is routinely accused of lacking
democratic legitimacy.92  This view of legitimacy assumes that
ICANN is some sort of governmental actor, though accounts differ
as to what government we might be talking about here, and what
type of actor within that government ICANN might be. Michael
Froomkin, perhaps ICANN's most plangent and well-informed critic,
assumes that the government in issue is that of the United States, and
ICANN is in fact assuming the mantle of one of the administrative
agencies.93 Since ICANN is not a formally constituted executive
agency, he argues that it falls foul of both U.S. administrative law
and the U.S. Constitution.94  Specifically, he suggests that the
Department of Commerce's use of ICANN to make rules violates
requirements for notice and comment in rulemaking and judicial
review, pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, or that it
violates the Constitution's non-delegation doctrine.95 "In either case,
the relationship violates basic [U.S.] norms of due process and public
policy designed to ensure that federal power is exercised
responsibly."
96
92. "[The U.S. Department of Commerce's] relationship with ICANN
violates fundamental U.S. policies that are designed to ensure democratic
control over the use of government power." Froomkin, supra note 88, at 27.
Even those who make the case for ICANN as a more efficient method of
domain name allocation and dispute resolution note that it cannot (or perhaps
should not) be resolving issues in distributive justice which more properly are
handled democratically. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial
Law: Lessons from 1CANN, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 257, 286-88
(2002).
93. See Froomkin, supra note 88, at 20.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. Id.; see also A. Michael Froomkin, Form and Substance in Cyberspace,
6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 93 (2002). Cf Edward Brunet, Defending
Commerce's Contract Delegation of Power to ICAN, 6 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 1 (2002) (arguing ICANN is based on proper legal
foundation because of the statutory authority of government to contract with
private entities); Joe Sims & Cynthia L. Bauerly, A Reply to Professor
Froomkin's Form and Substance in Cyberspace, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 125 (2002) (arguing that since ICANN is a revolutionary experiment it
would be impractical to apply rules of the past to the structures of the future);
Joe Sims & Cynthia L. Bauerly, A Response to Professor Froomkin: Why
ICANN Does Not Violate the APA of the Constitution, 6 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 65 (2002) (contending that ICANN does not violate the
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While these may be relevant considerations within a U.S.
constitutional environment, it is hard to see any broader political
commitment that is implicated by ICANN's actions. Indeed,
Froomkin has noted that this was not a criticism of ICANN, but
rather of the federal government's end run around their obligations.
97
As other commentators have noted, ICANN itself avoids the
explicit connection with the U.S. government, and instead sees itself
(at times) as trans-national and trans-governmental. However, it still
adopts features of certain types of actors within Western
governmental structures, especially actors within the U.S. system.
As Jonathan Weinberg demonstrates, ICANN has appropriated
features of both unrepresentative executive agencies and
representative legislatures. 98  Thus, ICANN adopts administrative
features such as notices of proposed rulemakings and comment
periods for interested parties, 99 reconsideration processes for parties
affected by rulemakings, 00 the existence of an external review
mechanism for decisions,1"' and so on.12 As Weinberg notes, even
the specifics of these features mimic U.S. administrative laws: who
is an affected party, timeliness of the reconsideration application,
exhaustion of rights, the concepts of interim relief, and pleading are
all familiar to the laws regulating U.S. executive agencies.'
0 3
The issue that emerges here is whether there are political
commitments which are implicated in agencies of this sort, and
which might be applied to ICANN. Indeed, since the rise of
administrative agencies within the United States was the basis for
much of the democratic deficit concerns during the last century,
ICANN's self-conscious invocation of U.S. administrative
approaches is interesting here. The criticisms of ICANN as an
administrative agency focus on features such as: "[t]he public's right
Constitution because it is not a state actor, and as a private actor, ICANN's
actions do not violate the non-delegation doctrine since it does not have
authority over the Internet and does not exercise governmental power).
97. See Froomkin, supra note 96, at 98 n.22.
98. See Weinberg, supra note 89, at 225-57.
99. See ICANN, BYLAWS, supra note 7, art. III, § 6.
100. See id. art. IV.
101. See ICANN, INDEPENDENT REvIEW POLICY, available at http://
www.icann.org/committees/indreview/policy.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
102. See Weinberg, supra note 89, at 228.
103. See id.
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to notice and meaningful comment; to accountable decisionmaking;
to due process; and to protection against arbitrary and capricious
policy choices, self-dealing, or ex parte proceedings are all
attenuated or eliminated; so, too, is the prospect of any meaningful
judicial review."'
10 4
Weinberg adopts similar concerns. We might consider each of
these to be relevant and appropriate political commitments, but in
fact they are little more than invocations of democracy once
removed. As Weinberg indicates elsewhere, the reason we care
about these issues is to reconcile administrative decision-making
with the "agencies' insulation from direct democratic control."' 10 5 He
goes so far as to say that any of ICANN's processes will be adjudged
legitimate only to the extent that it constrains itself, just like a federal
agency.'6 As a result, ICANN can only become legitimate if it
becomes democratic, and we are back to where we started.
2. ICANN as legislature
At other times and places ICANN specifically invokes features,
such as legislatures, that are more common in democratic
institutions. Various aspects of ICANN's structure and operational
methods have been created with an implicit democratic model. For
example, a number of committees and "supporting organizations"
have been created to influence the overall direction of the
organization. 10 7  Not only are these committees and supporting
organizations usually structured as representative democratic
institutions, but they also often contain explicit geographical
representation requirements. 0 8 There are problems with these
organizations, notably that they are not representative in the typical
one-person, one-vote sense, and also that they display some elements
of regulatory capture. 10 9  However, these concerns pale in
comparison to the nature of the Board.
It is at the highest level that ICANN's reliance on representative
democracy ideals has caused the most problems. ICANN's Board of
104. Froomkin, supra note 88, at 27.
105. Weinberg, supra note 89, at 219.
106. See id. at 225.
107. See id. at 235.
108. See id. at 236.
109. See id. at 239-42.
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Directors is constituted as a form of representative institution. There
are nineteen seats which are divided up so that certain constituencies
are represented: the CEO gets one spot, but three seats each are
given over to sub-groups of ICANN called the Domain Name
Supporting Organization (DNSO), the Address Supporting
Organization (ASO), and the Protocol Supporting Organization
(PSO). 110 These bodies may be seen as primarily technical groups
with responsibilities for various engineering aspects, but they include
members who are closely aligned with trademark owners,
commercial operators of domain name registries, and others whose
interest is primarily commercial.
The remaining nine seats are given over to the "at-large"
directors, who are supposed to represent the Internet community at-
large."' Here, things get really hairy. Initially these positions were,
effectively, internal appointments. 12  ICANN was forced to
introduce elections for five of the positions, 113 and has had a storied
relationship with them ever since. The seats were divided into
geographical regions, 114 and an election was held. The election was
a disaster, on almost any metric of the effectiveness of representative
elections. The constituency for each was huge, but unresponsive. Of
the hundreds of millions of people who might have voted for their
one representative, fewer than one thousand votes was enough to
secure the win for some representatives." 5 This extraordinarily low
110. See id. at 235-36.
111. Seeid. at237.
112. See id. at 245 (explaining that directors were selected by a majority vote
of the initial Board).
113. See Letter from J. Beckwith Burr, Acting Associate Administrator,
National Telecommunications and Information Administration, to Herb Schorr,
Executive Director, Information Sciences Institute, University of Southern
California (Oct. 20, 1998), available at http://
www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/press/icann1 02098.htm. Originally, Board
members argued that there was no need for explicit public involvement. See
E-mail from Joe Sims to comment-bylaws@icann.org, at
http://www.icann.org/comments-mail/comment- bylaws/msgOO025.html (Oct.
23, 1999) (Response to Froomkin). For an account of the political influence
brought to bear on this issue, see Weinberg, supra note 89, at 245-46.
114. See Preliminary Report, supra note 11; see also Weinberg, supra note
89, at 246 (explaining that the five new directors were to be elected from North
America, Central and South America, Europe, Africa, and Asia).
115. See Election.com, ICANN@Large Membership: Vote for Region 3
Director-Latin America and Caribbean, at http//www.election.com/us/icann/
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voter turnout can be attributed to a number of factors: most of the
world does not have access to the Internet, those who do have access
do not know about ICANN, and those who do know about ICANN
do not care about how it is run. However, another disincentive to
vote was the sheer difficulty of doing so. Although ICANN is the
online institution par excellence, much of the election took place
offline for security reasons, showing we are still dependent on
physical indicators of the reality of the elector." 6 So an elaborate
and expensive physical mailing took place, posting user
identification numbers and passwords to those who had initially
registered online." 7 Only then, armed with the physical slip of
paper, was the elector allowed to vote online.
Apart from the practical problems with running an election of
this sort, a number of obvious questions emerge. Weinberg suggests
two: first, what does it mean to "'represent' any community as ill-
defined as the Internet community," and second, should a technical
body like ICANN be representative at all? 1' 8 Other questions might
be added: first, why should a geographical distribution of regions be
a meaningful division of the online demos, and second, why have
representation at all?
In short, we are once again confronted with the question of
whether the problems with ICANN's democratic approach-in this
case, its attempt at representation-are meaningful. The idea of
representation itself does not appear, to me at least, as any kind of
political commitment of any online community. And particularly
within the kind of body that ICANN is, representation makes little
sense at all.
region3.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2003) (illustrating that Ivan Moura Campos
needed only 946 votes to win the Region Three election).
116. See THE PRACTICAL NOMAD, WHY I COULDN'T VOTE IN THE ICANN
AT-LARGE ELECTION, available at http://hasbrouck.org/icann/p-stage.htm (last
visited Feb. 11, 2003) (explaining in e-mail correspondence that ICANN
mailed PIN letters to at-large members and that ICANN lacked funding to send
anymore letters)..
117. Seeid.
118. Weinberg, supra note 89, at 248.
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3. ICANN as corporation
The recent report by Tamar Frankel on behalf of the Markle
Foundation advances a model of ICANN as corporate entity.119 For
example, the emphasis is placed upon management and the Board as
the relevant actors within the institution, extensive reference is made
to literature on the management and strategy of corporations, and so
on. 12  From this starting assumption, the report notes a legitimacy
problem for the corporation stemming not so much from democratic
deficits, but rather from poor management. 121 Examples of this
mismanagement include overbroad definitions of the functions of the
corporation, mission creep, uncontrolled staff expansion, and poor
performance evaluation.122
The report, therefore, seeks to present ways of addressing this
legitimacy concern by applying corporate governance understandings
of "accountability and oversight."' 123  So, for example, the
requirement of accountability involves undertaking performance
evaluations, public disclosure of evaluations, publication of budgets
and operational plans, and other metrics of responsible corporate
governance. 124  Oversight requires some deference to external
reviewers and the like. 25
This approach has much in common with the view of ICANN as
federal agency, inasmuch as external review and disclosures are also
remedies to democratic deficits presented there. However, since the
emphasis is on good management rather than on democracy for its
own sake, I have less concern about implicitly introducing pre-
modem conceptions of direct democracy here. In fact, the metaphor
of corporate governance seems somehow suitable to the obligations
we expect of institutions.
119. See FRANKEL, supra note 86. Frankel does suggest that ICANN might
be viewed as a legislative entity, but the emphasis is clearly upon the corporate
governance issues that ICANN presents.
120. See id. at 1-36 nn.49, 52, 56, 60-61, 64, 77-78, 87, 108, 118.
121. See id. at 1-3.
122. See id. at 1-2.
123. Id. at 1.
124. See id. at 7.
125. See id. at 17-18.
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B. On Voting, Democracy, and Constituencies
Much of the discussion above has endeavored to articulate some
views of those critical of ICANN. Much of this criticism, I argue,
has to do with assumptions about democracy, especially direct
democracy within online institutions. We see similar problems
emerge not just from critics of ICANN, but those inside it as well.
One of the basic problems with ICANN is, I think, its allegedly core
political commitment. 126 It adheres to "consensus" as the basis of its
legitimacy and as justification for the actions it undertakes. This idea
of consensus is never very well articulated, and many times it is
simply ignored. Let me bracket the issue of whether ICANN does, in
fact, engage in consensus, for the theoretical nature of consensus is
more interesting. The idea stems from ICANN's technical
background, and it involves the idea that a like-minded group of
individuals can agree on the best solution to technical, or political,
issues. To the extent that "consensus" is defined at all, it seems to
involve ideas of "widespread community support"'127 with "no strong
or reasoned opposition ' 128 that propagates from the community
members at the bottom, up to the decision-makers. Some have
concluded that consensus does not work in practice, since it demands
extremely costly mechanisms for input of views, and because
political decisions involve deciding to privilege one set of values or
one party's interests over another. 1
29
As a political theory, "consensus" is very closely allied with the
Libertarian view of bottom-up ordering presented by Hayek and
126. I say "allegedly" here because ICANN professes this as the basis of its
actions but rarely consults and has few if any mechanisms to gauge consensus.
See David R. Johnson & Susan P. Crawford, Why Consensus Matters: The
Theory Underlying ICANN's Mandate to Set Policy Standards for the Domain
Name System, at
http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/whyconsensus-matters.htm (posted Aug.
23, 2000) [hereinafter Johnson & Crawford, Why Consensus Matters]; David
Post, ICANN and the Consensus of the Internet Community, at
http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/icann and the consensus of the commu
nity.htm (Aug. 20, 1999); David Post et al., Elusive Consensus, at
http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/elusive-consensus.htm (July 21, 1999).
127. David R. Johnson & Susan P. Crawford, What's Wrong with ICANN-
and How to Fix It, at http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/
whats_wrongwithicann.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
128. Johnson & Crawford, Why Consensus Matters, supra note 126.
129. See Weinberg, supra note 89, at 252.
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others. 130  The idea carries with it implications of direct and
deliberative democracy theories. Consensus emerges where all
interested persons within the demos are able to engage in debate on a
given topic and have the right to vote on it. Direct democracy
appears to be extremely well-suited to the Internet, but does not
really reflect our political commitments as I have argued previously.
It is merely a nostalgic reference to a political system that never was,
and never could be.
The deliberative democracy features of consensus are
problematic for the reasons expressed when discussing Sunstein's
concerns about the Internet.131  There is little to suggest that
deliberative democracy translated online could ever reflect anything
other than an idealized version of a lab experiment. Real-life
political interactions do not seem to fit within the model of
deliberative democracy, so ICANN's reliance on this approach is
problematic.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this Article, I have asked whether our political commitments
can be, and have been, met by online institutions such as ICANN. I
think that if they have not been up to date, then it has been as a result
of deferring to the impoverished idea of democracy, not because of
some systemic problem with the form of online political institutions
we have seen to date.
To say that democracy is an inadequate grounding for criticisms
of online institutions, however, is not to say that these institutions
should be immune from criticism. It has not been possible here to
establish a normative theory of how best to meet our online political
commitments or even to explore more fully what those commitments
would look like. The task here has been simply to make democracy
seem less like an answer and more like a question.
There is clearly significant work which must be done here:
more and more trans-national and cyberspace political actors like
ICANN are likely to emerge as the current geo-political system is
found unequal to online challenges. We must then start to define
130. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES
AND ORDER 35-54 (1973).
131. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 7-10.
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what amounts to appropriate political concerns and what amounts to
mere vestigial appendages of a political system that never really
existed. Cyberspace should not be ruled like the Athenian Senate.
And neither should ICANN. But how it should be ruled is an open
question.
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